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Allen Schick suggested this event after the Federation of American Scientists presented 
me with their “science in the public service” award on the occasion of Federation’s 60th 
anniversary. A few years ago the award was renamed in honor of Hans Bethe, a very 
distinguished physicist who, among many other things, in 1938 first elucidated the 
sequence of nuclear reactions that power the stars, for which he was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in physics in 1967.  
There is a wonderful story about Hans. The day after he had worked out the reactions, he 
was walking at night with his then-fiancée (and later wife) Rose. She remarked on how 
beautiful the stars looked, and Hans said, “Yes, darling, and tonight I’m the only one on 
Earth who knows how they do it.” 
Hans was also the head of the theoretical division of the Manhattan Project. He later took 
a leading role in the arms control movement during the 1960s and again in the 1980s by 
arguing against the development of ballistic missile defense, explaining that a defense 
could be overcome at much lower cost by the offense. This illustrates one of paradoxes of 
the nuclear age: that developing a defense could, in the end, leave one less secure.  
The last recipient of this prize was Philip Morrison, a truly wonderful person who I had 
the great pleasure of having as an instructor in an undergraduate physics course. Phil 
probably was best known for his book reviews in Scientific American, for his wonderful 
science education programs on PBS, and for first suggesting SETI, the search for 
extraterrestrial intelligence, in radio signals.  
Phil worked on the Manhattan Project, too. He assembled the bomb that was dropped on 
Nagasaki, and a few days later surveyed the devastated city. A few months later he 
helped found FAS, and became an eloquent and impassioned advocate for nuclear arms 
control.  
It goes without saying that I’m incredibly flattered to have had my name mentioned 
alongside Bethe and Morrison. But two things worry me. First, I worry that you might 
think that I believe I’m in the same league as these giants. I assure that I know that I’m 
not.  
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I had to smile when Henry Kelly, the president of FAS, explained that they decided to 
give the prize to an “underappreciated person”—someone who has been toiling away in 
the trenches—in my case, helping to write reports for the National Academy of Sciences, 
serving on the boards of FAS and other NGOs, and occasionally playing the role of an 
anonymous adviser in the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy.  
In this regard, I’m following in the path of my dissertation advisor, John Holdren—
another recipient of the FAS award. He was the first—but not the last—person to remind 
me that one can accomplish a lot of good if you don’t care who gets the credit for it. 
The second thing that worries me is that Hans Bethe and Phil Morrison both died last 
year.  Their deaths came at the ripe old ages of 99 and 89, I’m happy to report, but the 
trend is worrisome, nevertheless.  
The FAS asked me to give a talk on nuclear weapons policy, so I thought I would speak 
on the same topic today. I have spent my career on things nuclear, much of it thinking 
about the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and how to minimize those dangers. 
And so, as part of my ongoing campaign to ensure that I will never again be asked to 
work for the U.S. Department of Defense, I’d like to propose that the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons should be the centerpiece of our nonproliferation policy—indeed, a key 
element of our overall foreign and defense policy. 
Soon after the end of the Cold War, there was much interest in the idea of prohibiting 
nuclear weapons. The Canberra Commission was the most prominent. It included Lee 
Butler, the previous Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, and former 
Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, as well as a former French prime minister and 
a former head of the UK defense forces.  
There were also books and reports by Pugwash, the Stimson Center, Jonathan Schell, and 
others. I served on a National Academy of Sciences committee that included several 
former commanders of U.S. nuclear forces, as well as several former nuclear weapon 
designers and Pentagon officials. That committee produced a consensus report that 
looked favorably on working toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons. 
The basic logic was straightforward. During the Cold War, the United States faced an 
implacable adversary. Were it not for U.S. nuclear weapons, many people believed that 
the Soviet Union was ready, willing, and able to use the huge armies under its control to 
subjugate all of Europe and most of Asia.  
And so nuclear weapons were at the very center of U.S. security policy—first to deter or 
defeat conventional attacks against U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, and then, as the Soviet 
Union developed a nuclear arsenal of its own, to deter nuclear attacks. 
The huge armies crumbled with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, 
and so disappeared the need to deter large-scale conventional war. The only remaining 
role for nuclear weapons, it seemed, was to deter a nuclear attack by Russia, and perhaps 
China.  
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But if we could somehow eliminate Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons, then there 
would seem to be little need for U.S. weapons. There remained serious questions about 
the practicality of this goal—in particular, whether we could ever be sure that other 
countries had eliminated their weapons, and how much it would matter if others cheated.  
But the fundamental desirability of the goal seemed compelling, at least from a U.S. 
perspective. This was summed up well by Les Aspin in 1992, at a commencement 
address at MIT:  
The United States is the biggest conventional power in the world. There is no 
longer any need for the United States to have nuclear weapons as an equalizer 
against other powers. If we were offered a magic wand that would wipe out all 
nuclear weapons and the knowledge of their construction, we’d wave it in a 
nanosecond. A world without nuclear weapons would not be disadvantageous to 
the United States. In fact, a world without nuclear weapons would actually be 
better. Nuclear weapons are still the big equalizer but now the United States is not 
the equalizer but the equalizee. 
Six months later Aspin became Secretary of Defense and commissioned a bottom-up 
review of U.S. nuclear policy. But the notion that the transformation in world politics 
called for a correspondingly fundamental transformation in nuclear doctrine never took 
hold.  
I know because I participated in the review. I saw first-hand how hard it is to seriously 
question policies and plans that have been in place for several decades, and which have 
been formalized by bureaucratic structures and procedures.  
There were reductions in the number of weapons, but the eliminated weapons were either 
obsolete or redundant or pointless, because their targets had been eliminated in the 
Warsaw Pact or former Soviet states. 
But the basic character of U.S. nuclear posture did not change. The U.S. continued to 
maintain a large, alert strategic force, targeted for rapid attack against Russian nuclear 
forces and command and control. This was largely due, I think, to bureaucratic inertia 
and the persistence of established patterns of thought and behavior. 
But in the late 1990s a new pattern of thought started to take hold—one that finds that 
nuclear weapons are now even more useful to the United States than they had been 
during the Cold War—not as central to U.S. security, perhaps, but essential nevertheless, 
and useful against a broader range of targets, and against many more countries.  
This new pattern fully blossomed after the election of George W. Bush. Leaked portions 
of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as other documents and statements, describe 
a belief that:  
• U.S. nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries from acquiring chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons and other advanced weaponry;  
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• That the U.S. should threaten and should plan to use nuclear weapons 
preemptively to prevent WMD attacks on the United States, its forces abroad, or 
U.S. allies; and 
• That the U.S. should use nuclear weapons to destroy certain high-value targets—
in particular, hardened and deeply buried targets, or stocks of chemical and 
biological weapons—that are difficult to destroy with conventional weapons.  
It’s fair to say that the authors of this doctrine, if offered Les Aspin’s magic wand, would 
chose not to wave it. They believe that nuclear weapons are valuable for much more than 
deterring nuclear attack. 
This doctrine isn’t just words in a high-level report. Leaked and declassified documents 
indicate that nuclear weapons are surprisingly prominent in the Pentagon’s operational 
plans. CONPLAN 8022 reportedly includes plans for preventive nuclear attacks against 
North Korea, Iran, and other countries.   
When President Bush said, in the State of the Union address, that “we cannot let out 
enemies strike first,” most Americans were unaware that this included U.S. plans to use 
nuclear weapons first. If they had been aware, they would disapprove, as opinion polls 
have consistently shown. At least, there should be a public debate about this. But all 
relevant documents are secret. Which leads to an interesting observation: if, as is often 
said, threats of preemptive nuclear use are a deterrent, why keep them secret? 
A thorough critique of the Bush nuclear doctrine would take most of the afternoon. Just a 
few points: 
• Many of the countries mentioned by name in the NPR—North Korea, Iran, Syria, 
and formerly Iraq and Libya—have been trying to acquire WMD in order to deter 
the United States from invading or otherwise attacking their vital interests. It’s 
absurd to suggest that U.S. nuclear threats will deter these countries from 
acquiring WMD. Quite the opposite—such threats will spur them on. 
• Threats and plans to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or a biological 
attack are at best unnecessary, and at worst counterproductive. Countries already 
know that the U.S. has nuclear weapons and that, if they hurt us badly enough, 
they might provoke a nuclear response.  
Explicit threats cannot add much to this “existential deterrence.” But they can 
lead the U.S. into a commitment trap, promising retaliation that might be grossly 
disproportionate. We shouldn’t get into a situation where our reputation depends 
on carrying out threats that don’t make sense. And retaliation would be senseless 
if we could not determine the true source of the attack. Such threats also violate 
the negative security assurances the United States has made, and restated 
repeatedly, not to use nuclear weapons against countries that don’t have them.  
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• Plans for preemptive use of nuclear weapons are even more dangerous. Such 
plans are often framed as necessary to prevent a devastating attack against the 
United States, by attacking key WMD targets before they can be used. But when 
you examine the logic of this argument, the utility of nuclear attacks evaporates.  
o First, U.S. intelligence would have to be virtually certain that an enemy 
was about to attack the United States. But how would we know this, and 
how could we convince others, after the fact, that preemption was 
justified? 
Activities that we might interpret as preparing for an attack might only be 
intended to signal their resolve—for example, to deter a U.S. invasion. A 
mistaken preemptive nuclear attack would be a tragedy, and unless it was 
perfectly effective it could trigger attacks against the United States that 
might have been avoided altogether. 
o Second, U.S. intelligence would have to correctly identify the enemy 
weapons, launchers, and command facilities necessary to carry out the 
attack. Two wars with Iraq have demonstrated the inability of U.S. 
intelligence to identify strategically important targets.  
Particularly instructive was the opening salvo of the current war, in which 
the United States dropped four 1-ton bombs on a site that U.S. intelligence 
believed was a command bunker containing Saddam Hussein. Later 
inspections revealed that no underground facility existed. Of course, if a 
nuclear weapon had been used we never would have known what was—or 
was not—there. 
Adversaries can use various deception techniques to hide their weapons 
and command facilities. They can use mobile facilities or play shell 
games, moving key functions between ordinary buildings. If we don’t 
know where the targets are, we can’t destroy them.  
o Third, assuming that we could correctly locate and identify them, the 
targets would have to vulnerable to nuclear attack, but not to conventional 
attacks. The only such class of targets is deep underground facilities. This 
is the reason that administration proposed to build a new nuclear earth-
penetrating warhead.  
Even here, conventional attacks on tunnel entrances and other surface 
features can disable the facilities. And even nuclear weapons can’t destroy 
very deep facilities, which merely encourages countries to dig deeper. 
o Finally, the collateral damage that would result from a nuclear attack 
would have to be deemed acceptable and proportionate. But over half of 
the suspected targets are located in or near cities; even a single nuclear 
attack in a major city is likely to kill hundreds of thousands of people. 
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It is difficult for me to imagine a U.S. president being confident enough in 
U.S. intelligence to order such a preemptive attack, and confident that he 
could subsequently justify it, to his own citizens and to the world, as 
having been necessary. 
Critics of the Bush nuclear doctrine have emphasized the damage it does to the 
nonproliferation regime. They cite the apparent violation of our negative security 
assurances. They claim that moves by the United States to enhance the usefulness of 
nuclear weapons will increase pressures on other countries to acquire nuclear weapons, 
and that it will undermine efforts to persuade other countries not to acquire them. After 
all, if the United States, by far and away the strongest conventional military power, needs 
nuclear weapons, then why does not every other country have even more need for nuclear 
weapons—especially those that face far more challenging security environments than the 
US? 
Defenders of the doctrine note that the decisions of the countries we are most worried 
about—North Korea and Iran—are not much influenced by US restraint. Their efforts to 
acquire nuclear weapons won’t be diminished if the US reduces the number of nuclear 
weapons it deploys, if we ratify the CTBT, if we forego a nuclear bunker-buster, or even 
if we pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. 
I tend to agree—US nuclear doctrine has little direct effect on the incentive of such 
countries to “go nuclear.” 
Instead, I think we should focus on how our nuclear doctrine affects our attitudes and our 
incentives to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. I think we’re kidding ourselves 
if we pretend that our nuclear forces are going to be able to protect us from attack, by 
preemptively destroying enemy weapons or enemy leaders. Our nuclear weapons are 
useful only as a deterrent, nothing more. 
Plans to use nuclear weapons preemptively are an impediment to thinking about and 
putting into place other measures that would be more effective.  
It’s time to admit that the nonproliferation regime is in serious trouble. North Korea 
probably already has nuclear weapons, and Iran has taken a major step in this direction. 
Like a perverse Johnny Appleseed, A.Q. Khan spread centrifuge enrichment technology 
around the world; how widely, we don’t know. Those that have it could give it or sell it to 
others. Several more countries could be producing HEU a decade from now. Some of 
these countries will be unstable and vulnerable to penetration by terrorists or their 
sympathizers—Pakistan is the poster child for such worries.  
 6
It is terrifyingly easy to make a nuclear bomb out of HEU. The bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima wasn’t tested before it was used; scientists had absolute confidence that it 
would work as predicted. In the 1960s, nonproliferation experts at Los Alamos National 
Lab wanted to know how easy it would be for other countries to design a bomb, so they 
hired two new physics PhDs, Bob Selden and David Dobbs, put them in a trailer and told 
them to design a bomb without access to any classified information. It was called the “nth 
country experiment.”  
By the end of the first few weeks Selden and Dobbs realized that it was so easy to make a 
gun-type weapon with HEU that it didn’t present any real challenge, so they spent the 
next two years designing a plutonium bomb—which Los Alamos weapon designers 
concluded would work just fine. 
If HEU is sold or stolen, it’s quite plausible that a terrorist group could make a gun-type 
weapon. Although we can deter countries from attacking us with nuclear weapons—
assuming we don’t invade their country and they have something to lose—it’s not clear 
that terrorists can be deterred.  
None of this is certain. We might muddle through, as we are trying to do now—
containing the North Korean or Iranian nuclear programs. Perhaps enrichment technology 
will spread no further; perhaps no HEU will be sold or stolen. Or perhaps not. 
Now consider the types of policy initiatives that would be necessary to substantially 
reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. They might include: 
• A prohibition on uranium enrichment and nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing, except 
as approved by an international body and placed under international control; 
• A prohibition on all use, and stocks of HEU or plutonium, except as approved by 
an international body and placed under international control; 
• A global environmental monitoring network able to detect any secret production 
of HEU or plutonium; and 
• Stringent international standards for the protection, control, and accounting of 
nuclear explosive materials; declarations of all stocks of nuclear materials; audits 
to ensure that declarations are accurate and complete; and inspections and red-
team exercises to ensure that agreed standards of physical protection are met. 
Today there is no chance of putting any of these policies into effect. The Bush 
administration would prefer to try to impose these measures on selected states of 
concern—a “just say no” approach to nonproliferation. But that isn’t going to work, at 
least not over the long run.  
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And this is where prohibition could be a useful concept. A decision by the United States 
to seriously advocate for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and to lobby other nuclear 
weapon states to join it, would dramatically change the terms of debate. It is the one thing 
I can think of—short of a nuclear detonation—that would get everyone’s attention and 
would allow such proposals to be seriously considered.  
Now, as you may know, the United States formally committed itself to the goal of 
prohibition when it signed the NPT, and we recommitted ourselves to that goal when the 
Treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, including endorsing a sequence of measures to 
reverse the nuclear build-up. But the current US national security establishment considers 
this a joke—one of those empty promises that states are obliged to repeat. 
John Bolton made the mistake of saying this out loud a couple of years ago. And the 2005 
NPT review conference ended in disarray largely because U.S. refused to discuss any 
new constraints on its freedom to develop, test, deploy, use, or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons. 
I’m talking about something very different from paying lip service to Article VI of the 
NPT—I’m suggesting that we would propose to supersede the NPT and associated 
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and other agreements with an entirely new treaty 
prohibiting nuclear weapons.  
This new treaty could contain an enforcement mechanism, or the permanent members of 
the Security Council could make it clear that they would authorize the use of force 
against any country found to be violating the Treaty. This proposal could be coupled with 
a program to make proliferation-resistant nuclear power available to all countries, as a 
measure to mitigate climate change. 
This isn’t going to happen overnight, of course. It would take decades to achieve a 
prohibition on nuclear weapons. But in the short term there would be many advantages in 
taking this position—enough, perhaps, to achieve some of the related agenda, such as 
placing all enrichment and reprocessing facilities and stocks of HEU and plutonium 
under international control. Many of these things could be done under the banner of 
laying the groundwork for prohibition. The United States, for its part, can demonstrate its 
commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  
You may think I’m dissembling here, because I’m saying that taking a strong unilateral 
position in favor of prohibition—but not actually getting rid of all our nuclear weapons 
prior to agreement on a treaty—would put us in a better position to prevent other 
countries or groups from getting nuclear weapons.  
But as a practical political matter, I know that we could not even start down this road 
unless the U.S. had decided that a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, if it could be 
achieved, would truly be in its own best interests. I think it would be. 
By committing the United States to eliminate its nuclear weapons, we would give 
ourselves the strongest possible incentive to see that no other countries were allowed to 
get the bomb. 
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It would also give us the moral and legal authority to assemble broad coalitions to 
enforce a global prohibition. It is very likely the only path toward removing nuclear 
weapons from the regions where they are most likely to be used—South Asia and the 
Middle East.  
To put it bluntly, if we aren’t going to have nukes, we’re going to make damn sure no one 
else does, either.  
Disarming ourselves is best way to communicate to others that spread of nuclear weapons 
in intolerable, and the best way to compel ourselves to act like we believe it. Threats to 
use force in order to thwart proliferation would be quite credible if the nuclear weapon 
states had voluntarily divested themselves of nuclear weapons. 
This is very different from today, and from the past three decades, where we constantly 
say that nonproliferation is a top priority, but every time we are forced to choose we give 
it a back seat to other concerns—most recently, the “war on terror”.  
What about undetected cheating? Here I think the biggest worry is the retention of 
nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear powers. Having thought long and hard about 
this, I don’t think that any system or monitoring and verification could rule out the 
possibility that Russia had hidden a few hundred warheads, or that China, Israel, India, 
Pakistan hadn’t squirreled away a few.  
In order to sign on to a prohibition, we’d have to be able to live with that risk—just as 
other countries would have to live with the risk that the United States had sequestered 
some warheads.  
I don’t think a handful of bombs in the basements of the current nuclear powers would be 
a huge threat. And I think it is a risk worth taking, in the sense that it is outweighed by 
the potential benefits of an agreement and the associated measures to greatly reduce the 
risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.  
Bear in mind that any of the countries that now have nuclear weapons could build new 
weapons from scratch in a matter of months. My first Ph.D. student—Michael Mazaar, 
wrote a very nice book on the potential of “virtual nuclear arsenals”—nuclear weapons 
that don’t exist, but could be created very quickly—to act as a deterrent to cheating or 
secret rearmament. Any hidden nukes could be used to advantage at most once, for a 
period of a few months, until others were able to build some of their own. What would 
they do with them during that month or two of nuclear monopoly? 
Would prohibition carry risks? Of course it would. But the continued overt possession of 
large nuclear arsenals by ten or more countries carries risks, too—risks that they might be 
used accidentally or without authorization, or as a result of miscalculation or inadvertent 
escalation, with unimaginably horrible consequences. Equally worrisome is the risk that 
nuclear weapons or nuclear materials will be stolen by terrorists, who might decide that 
their cause will be advanced by the destruction of New York or Washington, or London 
or Paris. 
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Most people in the national security establishment believe that the United States can and 
should and will retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. Indeed, the Bush 
administration currently is making plans to rebuild our capacity to design and produce 
nuclear weapons. Recently I have participated in discussions about a new program to 
design a “reliable replacement warhead”—a program to design new warheads that will 
last throughout the century.  
I think it’s interesting that the U.S. isn’t taking any serious steps to deal with climate 
change, which I think will be a real threat to U.S. over the next 50 to 100 years, but it’s 
sufficiently worried about the reliability of our nuclear weapons 50 to 100 years from 
now—and about our ability to design and build new warheads 50 to 100 years from 
now—that it’s launched a program to deal with this perceived problem.  
If we keep nuclear weapons and threaten to use them, so will others. Weapons or 
materials to build them will be sold or stolen. Eventually, more will join the club. Can 
this go on forever without a catastrophe? If the answer is “no,” then we ought to start 
thinking about the alternative, and I don’t see why we shouldn’t start today.  
At the meeting on the RRW, which was attended by people from the nuclear weapons 
laboratories and from strategic command, I asked whether anyone was looking at long-
term scenarios where we didn’t have to have highly reliable nuclear weapons 50 years 
from now, or where we had gotten rid of them altogether.  
One guy said “that isn’t our job.” I think it ought to be someone’s job.  
Thank you for your very kind attention. 
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